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Abstract 
This paper explores the effectiveness of 
several methods to reduce the overconfidence 
bias when eliciting continuous probability 
distributions in the context of multicriteria 
decision analysis.  We examine the effectiveness 
of using a fixed value method (as opposed to the 
standard fixed probability method) and the use 
of counterfactuals and hypothetical bets to 
increase the range of the distributions and to 
correct possible median displacements. The 
results show that the betting procedure to 
correct the median is quite effective, but the 
methods to increase the range of estimates have 
only a have small, but positive effect.   
 
1.  Introduction 
 
During the past 40 years behavioral research 
has demonstrated that laypeople and experts 
have many biases when making probability and 
utility judgments [1, 2, 3, 4]. During the same 
time period multi-criteria decision analysis has 
become a mature field with numerous 
applications to improve personal, government, 
and business decisions. Many decision analysts 
acknowledge the existence and pervasiveness of 
biases, but argue that analytical tools can reduce 
or eliminate them. However, some of these 
biases occur in the judgments required in 
decision analysis, which can substantially 
degrade the quality of an analysis.  
Biases occur in multi-criteria decision 
analysis during the assessment of values and 
utilities and during the assessment of risks and 
uncertainties. For example, the equal weighting 
bias occurs when assigning weights to multiple 
criteria.  The overconfidence bias occurs during 
the elicitation of probability distributions [5]. 
This paper focuses on biases during the 
assessment of risks and uncertainties.  A multi-
criterion example is the assessment of health 
risks and uncertain costs of health policies.  
Expert elicitation is often used to quantify these 
risks and uncertainties, because of a lack of 
conclusive data, few reliable models, and 
conflicting evidence. These expert judgments are 
known to be subject to biases.   
In a recent article, Montibeller and von 
Winterfeldt [ 5 ] reviewed a large number of 
biases and classified them by whether they are 
easy to correct or hard to correct with debiasing 
tools. The authors also called for research that 
tests and evaluates best practices in reducing 
biases that are hard to correct.  Presently, most of 
these debiasing tools are employed in an ad hoc 
way, without any assessment of their efficacy or 
comparison of their relative performance in 
reducing biases. This paper is the first in a series 
that examines well-established and extensively 
employed debiasing techniques. 
Specifically, we examine the well-known 
overconfidence bias and explore the efficacy of 
several techniques to reduce it. The 
overconfidence bias has been studied as early as 
the 1960s [6].  Summaries of the substantial 
research on this bias up to 1980 can be found in 
Lichtenstein et al. [7] and a more recent update is 
provided in Moore and Healy [8].  In short, when 
asked for probability judgments, subjects 
generally provide probabilities that are too 
extreme (when judging the probabilities of 
binary events) or provide probability 
distributions that are too tight (when estimating 
distributions over continuous variables). 
This bias is remarkably resistant to 
debiasing techniques [ 9 , 10 ].  Improvements 
appear to occur, when subjects get frequent 
feedback and when the response mode is 
changed to asking for probabilities, given fixed 
values of the uncertain variable. For example, 
weather forecasters, who have much experience 
with probability judgments and receive feedback 
almost daily, are remarkably well calibrated (for 
a summary, see von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
[11]). Regarding the response mode, Abbas et 
al., [12] and Seaver et al. [13] compared the 
usual fixed probability method (providing values 
for fixed cumulative probabilities) with a method 
in which the participants provided cumulative 
probabilities for fixed values and found better 
calibration for the latter. 
In this paper, we focus on overconfidence 
when eliciting probability distributions over 
continuous variables, as this type of judgment is 
frequently required in multi-criteria decision 
analysis.  We evaluate three techniques to reduce 
the overconfidence bias, which are widely 
employed in practice:  
1. Using a fixed value technique instead of a 
fixed probability technique. 
2. Using counterfactuals to probe and expand 
the extremes of the distributions. 
3. Using hypothetical bets to expand the 
extremes and to correct median estimates. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows. First we provide a brief literature review 
focusing on overconfidence when eliciting 
continuous probability distributions.  We also 
briefly discuss the most relevant techniques to 
reduce this bias.  Next, we describe the design 
and methods of an experiment to test the most 
promising debiasing techniques, followed by 
some of the key results.  The final section will 
provide conclusions and guidance for future 
research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Overconfidence bias 
 
Overconfidence, which is broadly defined as 
the excessive certainty that one knows the truth1, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Moore and Healy [8] differentiated various facets of 
overconfidence and defined three types of overconfidence: (i) 
has been considered as the most ubiquitous and 
potent form of cognitive biases that human 
judgment is vulnerable to [ 14, 15, 16, 17].  
The existence of the overconfidence bias has 
been demonstrated by numerous laboratory 
experiments and field studies in the literature. 
Overconfidence is measured either in binary 
choice tasks or in confidence interval tasks. In 
the former task people are asked to choose one of 
the two options for a correct answer, and then 
estimate how confident they are with their 
choice. In the latter task, participants are given 
questions with numerical answers (e.g., “How 
tall is the Eiffel Tower?”) and then asked to 
estimate a range of values that they are confident 
at a certain level (e.g., 90%) will include the 
correct answer [6]. We will be focusing this 
paper on the confidence interval task, as it is 
pervasive in decision analysis and more complex 
than the estimations required in binary choices.  
General results in confidence interval tasks 
show that the percentage of confidence intervals 
which include the correct answers is lower than 
their assigned confidence level (i.e., 90% 
confidence intervals contain the correct answer 
less than 50% of the time). In other words, 
elicited confidence intervals are too narrow and 
exclude too many possibilities – indicating 
people are too sure that they know the true 
answer when in fact they do not know it [6, 18, 
19 ]. This pattern has been replicated by 
numerous studies [14, 20 ] and is widely 
observed both in novice and expert judgments 
[21, 22, 23, 24, 25].  
Overconfidence bias has profound 
consequences in practice, especially in 
professional and expert judgment.  For instance, 
investors are excessively confident in their 
predictions on what an asset is worth, which lead 
them to engage in extraordinarily high trading 
activity [ 26 , 27 , 28 ]. Physicians and health 
professionals have been shown to reach their 
diagnosis too quickly and confidently by 
overlooking many other possibilities, which 
eventually results in mistreatment of patients 
[ 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 ]. Within organizations, 
individuals are overly confident in forecasting 
[33, 34], which leads them to make fallacious 
predictions (i.e., base-rate neglect), and ignore 
decision aids [35].  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
overestimation of one’s actual performance; (ii) 
overplacement of one’s performance relative to others; and 
(iii) overprecision in one’s belief (i.e., miscalibration). The 
respective categorization is widely accepted in the literature, 
but we continue to use the term “overconfidence” by 
referring to (iii) in this paper. 
Several psychological factors have been 
offered in the literature to explain why the 
overconfidence bias occurs. Anchoring is 
considered as an important factor that gives rise 
to the overconfidence bias, considering the fact 
that confidence intervals are set too close to the 
“best estimate” [1]: The best estimate serves as 
an “anchor” point from which people might 
insufficiently adjust their estimations for extreme 
points in the probability distributions. Another 
explanation is that the overconfidence bias 
occurs because, when providing a subjective 
confidence interval, people prefer to be more 
precise than to be more accurate in order to 
adhere to conversational norms (i.e., narrower 
intervals are preferred to wider intervals, even 
when the latter would include the correct 
answers, see [36, 37]. The limited capacity of 
human working memory is often held 
responsible for the occurrence of the bias as well 
[23]. Such a memory constraint leads people to 
hold only a small set of relevant facts and/or 
estimates in their memory one at a time, and 
consequently generate estimates with less 
variance.  Another, somewhat more general, 
factor that is thought to contribute to the 
overconfidence bias is related to the difficulty 
that people have in dealing with probabilistic 
judgments [38]. However, all these explanations 
receive only weak empirical support, and thus 
the underlying psychological mechanism for 
overconfidence remains unknown (for a detailed 
literature review, see Moore, Tenney & Haran 
[39]). 
A considerable amount of research has 
proposed various ways to overcome the 
overconfidence bias in order to improve 
judgments and avoid such severe consequences 
mentioned above. Next we briefly review several 
debiasing techniques offered in the existing 
literature, with a specific focus on those that are 
relevant to the present study. 
 
2.2. Debiasing techniques 
 
Overconfidence has been documented as a 
hard-to-correct bias [8]. The existing literature 
adopts different approaches in attempting to 
reduce the overconfidence bias, which can be 
broadly classified as follows [39].  
The first approach to debias overconfidence 
focuses on encouraging people to consider more 
information and/or “an alternative”. Soll and 
Klayman [19] asked participants to determine the 
cutoffs at the top and bottom ends of the range of 
possible values in order to engage them to search 
for more information. So instead of asking 
participants to determine the ends of an 80% 
interval, they asked participants to specify a 
number that is low enough such that there is a 
90% chance the correct answer is above it, and a 
number that is high enough such that there is a 
90% chance the correct answer is below it. As a 
result, overconfidence reduced to some extent. 
Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff [40] showed 
that the overconfidence bias is reduced when 
participants are asked to list counter arguments 
for their estimates before they report confidence 
levels in the accuracy of their choices. 
Overconfidence has also been shown to be 
reduced if people are forced to consider the 
alternative outcomes [ 41 ] or other potential 
outcomes before they estimate outcome 
probabilities [ 42 ]. Blavatskyy [ 43 ] used an 
incentive compatible method, which presumably 
encouraged participants to question/re-consider 
the level of confidence in the accuracy of their 
estimates since they exhibit less confidence 
when they were asked to bet on their own 
knowledge. 
A second approach, widely used for 
debiasing, is concentrated on the presentation 
and/or elicitation format for the question under 
investigation. Abbas et al. [12] and Seaver et al. 
[13] showed that participants produce less 
confidence in their accuracy when they were 
asked to provide probabilities for fixed values of 
the random variables than when they were asked 
to specify values for fixed cumulative 
probabilities. Teigen and Jørgensen [ 44 ] 
demonstrated that people have less confidence 
when they estimate values for a pre-determined 
confidence level. Winman, Hansson, and Juslin 
[45] proposed an adaptive elicitation method in 
which the participants were asked to estimate the 
probability of a pre-generated interval containing 
the correct answer, and then adjust this estimated 
probability until it matched the requested level of 
confidence. This iterative elicitation method 
resulted in less overconfidence, in comparison to 
directly produced intervals. Haran, Moore and 
Morewedge [46] developed another method in 
which the participants were able to see the entire 
range of possible intervals, and then asked to 
estimate the probability that each of these 
intervals contains the correct answer such that 
the sum of all probability estimates is amount to 
one. This method also led people to produce 
lesser degrees of overconfidence. 
Thirdly, providing people with more 
feedback is also believed to help reducing 
overconfidence, since feedback serves as a tool 
allowing people to correct their errors [ 47 ]. 
Several studies indeed demonstrated the positive 
effect of feedback on reduction in 
overconfidence in some cases [48,49]. However 
this effect is susceptible to various factors, such 
as task difficulty [50], estimation order (i.e., first 
estimation vs. following estimations, see 
Baranski and Petrusic [51 ], Lichtenstein and 
Fischhoff [52]), and type of judgment (i.e., high 
probability vs. low probability, see Baranski and 
Petrusic [51]). 
In the present study, we tested three widely 
employed debiasing techniques in decision 
analysis, as outlined in the introduction. They 
follow the first and second approaches described 
above, as providing feedback about the choices 
is not feasible in real-world decision analytic 
interventions, often characterized by long term 
horizons and one-off decisions. We detail next 
the experimental method employed in this study. 
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1. Participants & Materials 
 
One hundred and ten undergraduate students 
(Mage = 21.6) from the Polytechnic University of 
Turin participated in the study as a part of their 
activity in the course “Environmental Impact 
Assessment Procedures”. All students had 
previously taken a statistics course and therefore 
had basic knowledge of the concepts of 
probability and probability distributions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the four conditions described in detail below.  
Participants received instructions about the 
study in which they were asked to provide 
estimates for each of 10 questions, with five 
questions about environmental issues (i.e.,  
“What is the expected sea level rise in the next 
100 years, according to IPCC 2008 report?”), 
and five general knowledge questions (i.e., 
“What is the area of Italy?”). 
Participants were also given a detailed 
explanation about the answers they would 
provide, in particular in terms of probabilistic 
responses and the way their responses would be 
evaluated.  One of these evaluations was by way 
of counting surprises, i.e. the number of times 
the true value (not known to the participants) 
would fall below the 5th percentile of their 
probability distribution or above the 95th 
percentile.  They also were shown how the 
scoring rule by Matheson and Winkler [53 ] 
would be used to evaluate their probabilistic 
estimates. They were told that the participant 
who scored best in the scoring rule evaluation 
would be awarded 100 Euros in cash to 
incentivize accuracy.  
 
3.2. Design & Procedure 
 
Participants’ subjective probability 
distributions were elicited either through the 
Fixed Probability method, or the Fixed Value 
method. Through each elicitation method, either 
the Counterfactuals technique or the 
Hypothetical Bets technique was employed. 
Therefore we have four experimental conditions: 
Fixed Probability Counterfactual (FP_C), Fixed 
Probability Hypothetical Bet (FP_H), Fixed 
Value Counterfactual (FV_C) and Fixed Value 
Hypothetical Bet (FV_H). The study consisted of 
three main phases, as follows: 
Phase 1: In the FP_C and FP_H conditions, 
participants were asked to provide the following 
values for the question under evaluation, 
respectively: (a) the lowest number such that 
they are absolutely sure that the true answer 
would not be below it, (b) the highest number 
such that they are absolutely sure that the true 
answer would not be above it, (c) best guess so 
that the chances of the true answer falling below 
or above is 50/50 (d) a low end such that there is 
a 10% chance that the true answer is between 
this low end point and their lowest value, and (e) 
a high end such that there is a 10% chance that 
the true value answer is between this high end 
point and their highest value. This sequence of 
elicitation is fairly standard in decision analysis, 
as it first establishes the three key points of the 
distribution (min, max, median) and then 
identified other points that allow to identify the 
shape of the distribution. 
In the FV_C and FV_H conditions, 
participants were first asked to provide the 
following values: (a) the lowest number such 
that they are absolutely sure that the true answer 
would not be below it, and (b) the highest 
number such that they are absolutely sure that 
the true answer would not be above it. 
Afterwards, the lowest to highest number 
interval was divided into 50% of the interval 
value, then 10% and 90% of the interval value, 
and subjects were asked to provide the 
cumulative probabilities for each of the three 
values in between the lowest and the highest 
value they gave. 
While responding, the cumulative 
probability distributions were plotted on the side 
of screen. Once these initial estimations were 
completed, the participants were allowed to 
revise their estimations (that stayed on the screen 
throughout the entire task) before they proceeded 
to Phase 2. 
Phase 2: After providing the initial 
estimates in Phase 1, several debiasing 
conditions were applied. In the FP_C and FV_C 
conditions, participants were asked if they could 
think of explanations under which the true 
answer was (i) lower than their initial lowest 
estimate, and (ii) higher than their initial highest 
estimate. If they stated they could think of an 
explanation, they were requested to revise their 
initial estimates downwards for (i), and upwards 
for (ii). Otherwise no revision was required. 
In the FP_H and FV_H conditions, 
participants were asked to imagine hypothetical 
betting situations in which they would have to 
pay 100 Euros if the true value was (i) below 
their initial estimate for the lowest value, or 
receive 1 Euro otherwise; and (ii) above their 
initial estimate for the highest value, or receive 1 
Euro otherwise. If they said they would reject the 
bets, they were asked to revise their initial 
estimates downwards for (i), and upwards (ii). 
Phase 3: Finally, for all four conditions, 
participants were asked which side of the median 
(estimated in Phase 1) they would bet on. In the 
FP method, the participants provided the median.  
In the FV method, the median was interpolated 
from the participants’ probability judgments 
assuming a piece-wise linear cumulative 
distribution.  If they stated to place a bet above 
the median, they were requested to adjust the 
median upwards, such that they would be 
indifferent between betting on the lower and 
upper sides. If they stated that they would bet 
below the median, they were asked to adjust the 
median downwards, again to make them 
indifferent between betting on either side.   If 
they stated that they had no preference between 
betting above or below their median, no 
adjustment was required. Once Phase 3 was 
completed, participants could see a display of 
their initial and revised cumulative distributions 
and could make one more revision of the revised 
distribution.  Subsequently, they moved on to the 
next question.  
 
4. Results 
 
All 110 participants completed the 
probability estimates for all ten questions. We 
eliminated estimates that produced non-
monotone cumulative distributions, because this 
indicated that the participant did not understand 
the instructions. We also eliminated outlier 
responses defined as the minimum estimate 
falling above three times the true value or the 
maximum estimate falling below 1/3rd of the true 
value.   
The question “What is the inclination (in 
centimeters) of the Piazza Vittorio Veneto” 
produced many estimates that would eliminate 
participants by the outlier criterion.  We suspect 
that many participants responded in meters 
instead of centimeters, but in retrospect this was 
difficult to trace and correct. We therefore 
eliminated this question from further analysis. 
After eliminating the Piazza Vittorio Veneto 
question there were 166 outlier responses: 59 
were non-monotone and 107 were too extreme to 
be credible (not meeting the 3 times and 1/3rd  
criteria below). The remaining data consisted of 
824 pairs of initial and revised cumulative 
probability distributions for nine questions and 
110 participants. 
We conducted three analyses: Counts of 
revisions of low or high estimates in response to 
the counterfactual and betting treatments, 
surprises, both for initial estimates and revised 
ones, and counts of revisions of medians and the 
direction of these revisions (towards or away 
from the true value). We also analyzed whether 
there were any differences between the 
environmental and the general knowledge 
questions. 
 
4.1 Revisions 
 
The experiment was designed to determine 
if best practices in decision analysis aimed at 
reducing overconfidence had an effect.  Table 1 
shows the number and percentage of revisions of 
initial estimates depending on the fixed 
probability vs. fixed value treatments. 
 
Table 1.  Counts and percentages of 
revisions of one or both tails of the 
probability distributions for the FV vs. FP 
method 
 
Revised Not*Revised Total
Fixed*P 136*(37%) 297*(69%) 433
Fixed*V 126*(26%) 265*(74%) 391
Total 262 562 824  
 
 
Only about 1/3 of the participants made 
revisions. There were slightly more revisions for 
the fixed probability procedure than for the fixed 
value procedure, but the difference is not 
significant. 
 
Table 2 shows that there are significantly 
more revisions using the counterfactual method 
than using the betting method (p<0.001)2. 
 
Table 2.  Counts and percentages of 
revisions of one or both tails of the 
probability distributions for counter-
factuals vs. betting debiasing 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Surprises 
 
Surprises were instances in which true value 
fell outside the 90% range of the participant’s 
estimates.  Table 3 shows that there were a large 
number of surprises (50% vs. 10% expected with 
perfect calibration) and that there was no effect 
of the treatments overall in reducing surprises. 
 
Table 3.  Count and percentages of 
surprises across all conditions and 
questions 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the number of surprises after 
revision for the fixed probability vs. the fixed 
value conditions. There are slightly less surprises 
for the fixed value procedure (p=0.07). 
 
Table 4.  Count and percentages of 
surprises for the FP vs. FV debiasing 
methods 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  probability	  values	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  Chi-­‐square	  test	  for	  independence.	  
Table 5 shows the number of surprises for 
the revised estimates for the counterfactual vs. 
hypothetical bets procedure.  There are slightly 
less surprises for the counterfactual procedure 
but this effect is not significant. 
 
Table 5.  Count and percentages of 
surprises for the hypothetical bets vs. 
counterfactual debiasing procedures 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Median Displacement 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the median 
displacement analysis in terms of the count and 
percentage of participants who responded 
affirmatively when asked whether they would 
bet on one or the other side of their estimated 
median. The results show that about half of the 
responses were affirmative with a trend for the 
FV procedure to elicit more affirmative 
responses (55%) than the FP procedure (42%) 
(p<0.001). 
 
Table 6.  Count and percentages of 
revisions in response to the median 
betting question 
 
 
Bet Don't(Bet Total
Fixed(P 180((42%) 253((58%) 433
Fixed(V 215((55%) 176((45%) 391
Total 395 429 824  
 
To examine, if the shift in response to the 
betting question was towards or away from the 
true value, Table 7 shows the count and 
percentages of the shifts in direction for those 
who answered affirmatively to the betting 
question. 
 
Table 7.  Counts and percentages of 
shifts of the median towards or away 
from the true value 
 
Away No'Change Towards Total
FixedP 57'(32%) 17'(9%) 106'(59%) 180
FixedV 96'(45%) 24'(11%) 95'(44%) 215
Total 153 41 201 395  
For the fixed probability method the shift was 
predominantly towards the true value, but for the 
fixed value method there was no noticeable 
movement towards the true value (p=0.013). 
We found no significant differences when we 
analyzed these patters for the environmental 
questions vs. the general knowledge questions.   
   
5. Conclusion 
 
This study tested several “best practices” of 
decision analysts to debias the well-known 
overconfidence bias in the case of continuous 
probability distributions.  It first re-established, 
as many studies before it, that the 
overconfidence bias is strong and persistent with 
about half of the participants exhibiting 
overconfidence as defined by surprises.   
The debiasing treatment to widen the low 
and high estimates of participants’ probability 
distributions were not very effective.  The fixed 
value method, which has shown some promise in 
the Seaver et al. [13] and Abbas et al. [12] 
studies showed some minor improvement in 
terms of reducing surprises, but not nearly as 
much as in these previous two studies.  This is 
probably due to the fact that participants started 
with their own high low and high estimates, 
followed by a sectioning of the range they 
defined. Since the bias is mostly a result of 
defining the low and high initial estimate too 
narrowly, a better procedure is to provide these 
estimates externally.  Of course, this may 
involve other anchoring biases as well as being 
considered information by the participant. 
The effects of the betting and counterfactual 
procedures were also relatively small, but the 
counterfactual method appeared to do better than 
the betting procedure.   
There was a strong and significant effect of 
the betting procedures to correct the initial 
median estimate. Across questions and 
participants, about half the responses indicated a 
preference to bet on one side of the initial 
median or the other, similar to observations by 
decision analysts in real applications with 
experts.  On the other hand, the improvements in 
terms of revisions that are closer to the true value 
are relatively minor, with the revisions leading to 
more improvement for the fixed probability 
procedure. 
In conclusion, we were able to demonstrate 
some positive effects of using best practices in 
debiasing overconfidence, but the effects were 
not as large as one would hope. Future research 
should explore using the fixed value method 
with externally provided lower and upper 
bounds, more realistic and convincing techniques 
to expand the range from the minimum to the 
maximum of the uncertain variable, as well as 
the effects of training and practice.   
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